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320 Abstract
The paper provides a systematic review of what is known about the financial 
transactions tax, its practical application in EU countries and elsewhere in the 
world and its impacts on financial markets. A special emphasis is placed on the 
outlook for the taxation of financial transactions in the EU and the possibilities 
and constraints in the Republic of Croatia. The results of the analysis show the 
propensity of countries to the taxation of financial transactions, particularly 
 because speculations on the financial markets before the outbreak of the crisis 
enabled high economic rents to be generated, while during the crisis period, failed 
speculations were paid for with ample government support because of the fear 
that the stability of the financial sector would be distorted. Analysis of the possi-
bility of taxing the Croatian capital market according to the proposed European 
model shows that the inclusion of the Republic of Croatia in the common taxation 
procedure would be justified, although the revenue from such a tax would be rela-
tively small.
Keywords: financial transactions tax, taxation of the capital market in the EU and 
Croatia
1 INTRODUCTION
The world’s financial market underwent a surge in development in the two decades 
before the outbreak of the financial crisis. The turnover of financial transactions at 
global level in 1995 exceeded the value of world GDP more than twenty times, and 
in 2007 more than seventy times the turnover of world GDP at that period (Euro-
pean Parliament, 2010). Financial markets, then, are an important tax source, and 
many states apply various forms of the taxation of financial transactions.
In 2009, leaders of G-20 countries suggested to the IMF that it should investigate the 
ways in which the financial sector could make a more equitable contribution to pub-
lic finances. By way of answer, in 2010 the IMF proposed two approaches. The first 
was based on targeted levies that financial institutions would pay into a common 
fund, the resources of which would be used for the resolution of failed financial in-
stitutions, endeavouring to prevent future crises in the financial sector. The second 
proposal covered the possibilities of taxing the activities of the financial sector at a 
general level, that is, the introduction of a tax on financial transactions (FTT, Finan-
cial Transaction(s) Tax) and a tax on financial activities (FAT, Financial Activities 
Tax). Although no G-20 level agreement has been achieved, some countries have 
begun to tax the financial sector more stringently (IMF, 2010).
In 2011, forty states were implementing some form of tax on financial transac-
tions, most frequently on a unilateral basis, with many specific features in the 
form and manner of the taxation. In spite of that fact, the relative revenue from the 
tax is very low, and hardly reaches 0.5% of the GDP of the given country. In the 
last twenty years before the economic crisis, the importance of this form of taxa-
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321order to enhance the competitiveness of their domestic financial markets (Mathe-
son, 2011).
The following chapter sets out some theoretical considerations about the tax on 
financial transactions, individual effects on the market are investigated (such as 
volatility, liquidity, cost of capital, volume, efficacy), tests out the effect on tax 
revenue and ascertains the tax incidence. Part three refers to the European system 
of financial transaction taxation. Part four considers the outlook for the taxation of 
financial transactions in the Republic of Croatia, with a reference to budgetary 
capacities.
2  THE IMPACTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF A TAX ON FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS
The form in which a state becomes involved in market movements via taxation 
always has certain implications. Those in favour of introducing a financial trans-
actions tax think that it can improve market movements, encourage the develop-
ment of economic relations and reduce speculative trading, while opponents con-
sider that this type of taxation should increase liquidity.
IMPACTS ON TRADING VOLUME
Empirical studies indicate that greater transaction costs will reduce the volume of 
trading, while the intensity will depend on market elasticity. Some studies have 
calculated elasticity exclusively on the basis of changes in the tax rate, but others 
have taken into their base the difference between purchase and sale, and the most 
accurate take into consideration the total costs of transactions. If trading volume 
elasticity is calculated on the basis of some of the components of total transaction 
costs (changes in the tax rate, bid-ask spreads) then elasticity with respect to total 
costs will be higher (Matheson, 2011:16).
Elasticity of trading volume with respect to transaction costs depends on the ob-
servation period. Thus in the UK, short-term elasticity is -0.5 and long term is -1.7 
(Jackson and O’Donnell, 1985). For Sweden, Lindgren and Westlund (1990) 
 determined the elasticity of trading volume with respect to total transaction costs 
in a range between -0.85 and -1.35.
In financial markets with fixed yields, research has suggested a much more pro-
nounced market reaction to taxation. The introduction of a 0.2 to 3 basis points tax 
on bond trading in Sweden led to a considerable reduction in the volume of trade. 
Trading in long-term bonds, for which there is a large number of non-taxable alter-
natives, was reduced by 85% when the taxation was announced. Trading in short-
term debt instruments was reduced by about 20% (Froot and Campbell, 1994).
Elasticity of trading volume on currency markets is estimated in general, with re-
spect to transaction costs, at -0.4. This negative elasticity reflects a wide multilat-
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322 IMPACT ON VOLATILITY
Summers and Summers (1989) considered the impact on price volatility and es-
tablished that there were positive impacts related to moderation of the instabilities 
caused by speculative trading because of the smaller amount to which funds were 
channelled to the financial sector.
Empirical research however confirms the much more complex link between the 
introduction of a tax and the appearance of short-term price volatility. Medhavan, 
Richardson and Roomans (1997) claim that price volatility can be explained with 
the use of four variables: public information, private information, transaction 
costs and market frictions. The impact of public information on volatility can 
range between 35 and 46%, of private information between 26 and 31%, of trans-
action costs between 22 and 35%, and of market frictions between 1 and 4% 
(Mehavan, Richardson and Roomans, 1997).
Matheson (2011:20) distinguishes short-term and long-term price volatility. By 
short-term, he means short-term market fluctuations in asset prices that do not 
deviate essentially from their fundamental value. Long-term and short-term vola-
tility do not necessarily have to be correlated.
Studying the link between short-term price volatility and transaction costs in 23 
countries, Roll (1989) found no casual link. Baltagi et al., (2006) also found no 
important impact of taxation on price volatility. Deregulation of the American 
stock market reduced transaction costs and price volatility (Jones and Seguin, 
1997). Franch and Roll (1986) show that the actual process of trading causes 
short-term volatility and that the taxation of transactions, reducing the number of 
trades, can reduce price volatility. Habermeier and Kirilenko (2001) established 
that a tax increases price volatility and at the same time reduces the volume of 
trading on financial markets.
Since the tax has the same effect on well-informed investors, who reduce market 
volatility correcting asset values in the direction of their fundamental value and 
poorly informed or noise investors who increase price volatility, the net effect of 
taxation on volatility depends on the microstructure of a given market (De Long 
et al., 1989).
IMPACT ON LIQUIDITY
Preservation of the liquidity of markets is the primary task of all financial market 
regulators. Matheson (2011) particularly points out that a financial transactions 
tax reduces the volume of trading, which can also reduce liquidity and volatility. 
The influences of liquidity and volatility, then, are complementary to each other.
Although Oxera (2007) claims that the introduction of the UK stamp duty had 
negative impacts on liquidity, the UK is not considering abolishing this form of 
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323cial transactions and is also the oldest form of taxation in the country that is still 
being applied (Dieter, 2003). A study carried out with respect to Asian markets 
shows that a financial transactions tax can reduce liquidity as a result of the reduc-
tion of the number of financial transactions (Zhang, 2001).
Imposing a tax on stock exchange transactions can have various effects on liquid-
ity in markets marked by information asymmetry. Subrahmanyan (1998) says that 
taxation of transactions will reduce liquidity on oligopolistic markets, but not on 
monopolist, where liquidity can be increased if a monopolist, a market maker, has 
information of which other traders are deprived, for taxation reduces information 
asymmetry on the market.
The tax rate has to be placed at a level low enough not to distort the market, while 
at the same time providing sufficient tax revenue.
IMPACT ON SHARE VALUE AND CAPITAL COSTS
Theoretical models confirm that higher transaction costs, including taxation costs, 
can lead to a reduction in the value of shares (Kupiecs, 1996). Investors have to 
bear larger costs when they buy shares, and will demand higher yields, which will 
tend to produce a reduction in share prices.
Higher transaction costs lead to an increase in the costs of capital of companies 
whose shares are being traded. A liquidity premium for shares can also be an im-
portant factor influencing evaluation. Block (2007) shows that retained shares of 
companies that are not traded are worth 20 to 25% less than comparable shares. 
Higher transaction costs, then, increase the cost of capital of companies that issue 
taxable securities.
It seems clear that because of taxation investors will be ready to keep shares longer 
and trade in them less, which can reduce their liquidity. Reduced liquidity thus 
reduces tax revenue, makes it more difficult to sell a financial instrument and ulti-
mately reduces the value of the actual stock.
As for the effect of taxation on the cost of capital, Schwert and Seguin (1993) have 
estimated that the imposition of a 0.5% securities transaction tax in the USA 
would lead to an increase in the cost of capital of between 0.1 and 1.8 percentage 
points. Oxera (2007) estimates that repeal of the stamp tax in the UK would lead 
to a rise in share prices of 7.2% and a reduction of the cost of capital of between 
0.66 and 0.8 percentage points.
IMPACT ON MARKET EFFICIENCY
In an efficient market, asset prices at once reflect all the available information. 
When new information arrives in an efficient market, investors adjust their assets 
according to the newly arriving information, which leads to changes in prices. If 
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324 ences in prices being pared down at the same time. Since for investors an FTT is 
a transaction cost, adjustment of prices will be slowed down or in other words a 
longer period will be required for the newly arriving information to be completely 
reflected in prices. In this way the taxation of financial transactions can reduce 
market efficiency (Habermeier and Kirilenko, 2001).
If taxation is considered from the viewpoint of its impact on market efficiency, it 
can be concluded that reduced transaction costs suit short-term trading in securi-
ties and derivatives. Many short-term trades are of a speculative nature based 
mainly on a technical analysis and hence lead to increased price volatility and the 
appearance of speculative bubbles. When transaction costs are increased, the 
number of short-term trades is reduced, which in turn reduces volatility and the 
possibility that securities will be incorrectly valued.
IMPACT ON TAX REVENUE
One of the main reasons for the introduction of an FTT is to increase tax revenues, 
which will depend on three parameters: the tax rate, the volume of trading weig-
hted by the average price level and the number of transactions undertaken. When 
the rates are raised, then tax revenue will also rise; but at the same time the  number 
of transactions effectuated and the volume of trading will fall, and the ultimate 
impact on tax revenue depends on the elasticity of the market to the increased 
transaction costs.
In order to reduce the tax burden, investors will endeavour to reduce their trading 
in short-term securities and will be oriented to long-term securities or to foreign 
capital markets with lower tax burdens.
Umlauf (1993) also mentions, in addition to the direct effects on tax revenues, that 
the introduction of an FTT would reduce income from capital gains tax.
TAX INCIDENCE
The greatest burden of the taxation would be shouldered by security holders, and 
since they are mainly individuals with high incomes, taxation can have a progres-
sive effect (Matheson, 2011).
In the long term, the market will endeavour to equalise the rate of yield on capital 
in taxed and non-taxed markets. Because of the rise in the cost of capital, compa-
nies will try to finance their operations with non-taxable sources. Because of the 
smaller supply of taxed substitutes and the greater demand for non-taxed financ-
ing, yields on taxable sources of financing will fall and the yields on non-taxable 
will rise, until the yields even out. How much total investment will fall because of 
a rise in the cost of capital will depend on elasticity of supply and demand. In a 
small open economy return on capital depends on international market trends, and 
capital will drain out of a country until the yield after taxation is equal to the yield 
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325burden of taxation entirely. Since supply of capital is not perfectly elastic in mar-
ket conditions the yields on capital will fall. The final tax burden thus will be 
shared by owners of capital and by labour according to the relative elasticities of 
capital supply and demand (Matheson, 2011).
It can be concluded that taxation of securities transactions will reduce the volume 
of trading, the reduction depending on the tax rate, the specific features of a given 
market, the kind of securities, the existence of untaxed substitutes and taxation on 
competitive capital markets. The impacts of volatility and liquidity are comple-
mentary to each other, and the effect of taxation will depend on the microstructure 
of a given market. Taxation can reduce share value and increase the cost of capital. 
There is thus a dual effect of taxation on market efficiency. On the one hand taxa-
tion increases transaction costs and in this way slows down the adjustment of 
 securities’ prices, exerting pressures that reduce market efficiency; on the other 
hand, by reducing speculative trading, it can also increase market efficiency. Re-
duced volume of trading because of the reduction of investor profit will also tend 
to diminish revenue from the taxation of capital gains.
3  A COMMON TAX ON FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS  
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
According to the EC (2012) support of member states to the financial sector be-
tween October 2008 and December 31, 2011 came to 1.6 trillion euros, or about 
13% of European GDP. Over 60% of this amount related to state guarantees to 
banks. The European Commission (2013c) estimated that direct benefits from the 
under-taxation of the financial system came at an annual level of about 18 billion 
euros (primarily in the context of VAT).
A common FTT should indirectly harmonise the taxation of the financial sector, 
essential for a proper functioning of the internal market, prevent damaging tax 
competition in the trading of financial instruments within the EU, and ensure that 
the financial sector makes a more equitable contribution to public finances.
An essential reason for the introduction of a common FTT is certainly the attempt 
to prevent suspect and speculative transactions and the provision of tax neutrality 
among countries, thus contributing to protection against tax evasion.
3.1  BASIC DETERMINANTS OF COMMON TAXATION OF FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
A common FTT would contribute significantly to the conditions of trading in fi-
nancial instruments in the EU. Anticipated is the taxation of all financial institu-
tions that trade in basic or derivative financial instruments, even outside organised 
markets. Transactions with original instruments would be taxed at a minimum rate 
of 0.1% on the amount of the transaction, and transactions in derivative instru-
ments at a minimum rate of 0.01% on the notional value of the derivative contract. 




















































40 (3) 319-336 (2016)
326 to facilitate harmonisation of the application of the FTT, other forms of taxation 
of financial transactions would not be permitted. However, countries would be 
able to set their own rates, higher than the minimum, letting them provide addi-
tional sources of revenue. Accordingly, only transactions among financial institu-
tions of the participating countries would be taxed. The proposal is based on the 
triple-A approach, meaning it refers to All markets, All instruments and All actors.
According to European Commission (2013b) the following would be considered 
financial institutions: investment companies, organised markets, credit institu-
tions, insurance and reinsurance companies, investment funds and investment 
fund management companies, pensions funds and pensions funds management 
companies, holding companies, leasing companies, special purpose companies 
and other institutions as defined by statute. As well as these, other companies that 
undertake certain financial activities that exceed 50% of their annual income 
would also be considered financial institutions.
The FTT is primarily aimed at the taxation of financial transactions that are con-
ducted by financial institutions, whether for their own account or the account of 
some other person. Transactions of the European Central Bank, the central banks 
of EU member states and competent bodies for the maintenance of financial sys-
tem stability such as the European Financial Stability Facility and the European 
Stability Mechanism would be exempted from taxation.
Standard financial transactions of individuals and companies (making deposits, tak-
ing out loans, various forms of payment) would not be subject to taxation. The aim 
here is to protect the real sector against additional tax burdens. However, if indi-
viduals or business entities take up trading in securities or make derivative contracts 
via financial institutions, they will come within the scope of the FTT. Although 
natural persons and business entities of the real sector should not be considered lia-
ble to pay FTT, they could well end up bearing the economic burden of the taxation.
Although taxation would bypass the primary capital markets, the implications on 
the primary market itself are questionable. Will the economy be ready to finance 
its own operations with primary emission?
The implementation of an FTT would not be restricted to trading in organised 
markets, but would also take in over-the-counter markets, which would lead to an 
enlargement of the taxable amount. Transactions of larger amounts, because the 
regulatory requirements are not so exacting and because of the lower costs, are 
commonly conducted outside the organised markets. Also taxable would be repo 
and reverse repo operations, but only in the context of the initial exchange of in-
struments. The return transaction would not be subject to taxation (European 
Commission, 2103b).
According to the current proposal of the European Commission (2013b) struc-
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327would be determined at the moment the derivative contract is made and at the time 
of the sale, transfer or replacement of derivative contracts, not taking cash flow 
into consideration, only the execution of contractual obligations. If it is generated, 
a transaction with an original financial instrument would be additionally taxed. It 
is necessary to point out that spot currency transactions are not subject to the FTT.
Derivative contracts that relate to trading in commodities (mostly gold, silver, pre-
cious metals or oil) without any real exchange of commodities would be subject 
to the payment of the FTT, for they are mostly speculative or aimed at the protec-
tion of assets without any real intention of physical assets being traded (European 
Commission, 2013b).
Investment and pension funds would be liable to pay the FTT in financial transac-
tions in the management of the assets of the fund, but not when they are issuing 
their own securities (issue of certificates of the purchase or redemption of shares). 
Investment and pensions funds would be liable to pay the FTT in the scope of ac-
tive trading.
It is planned to achieve the prevention of tax evasion, market disruptions and the 
redirection of transactions to a more favourable tax regime by a combination of 
the principle of residence as a basic principle of taxation with elements of the is-
suance principle. Such a regime will make it more difficult for taxpayers to relo-
cate the place of their regular business activity, which will prevent tax evasion.
A financial institution that undertakes taxable financial transactions would be 
taxed according to the country of its residence, irrespective of the place of issu-
ance of the actual transaction. If various financial institutions that have their place 
of residence in different member countries carry out financial transactions among 
themselves, each member state would have the right to withhold tax according to 
a set tax rate. The proposal of taxation according to European Commission based 
on double taxation in fact is not applicable nowadays in most European countries.
An FTT according to the proposal of the European Commission (2013b) could 
damage financial institutions, because taxation would diminish their competitive-
ness on the international market.
In the case of trading in securities carried out by non-residents, outside the juris-
diction of the FTT, issued in a country in which FTT is applied, the already men-
tioned residence principle is supplemented with the principle of country of issu-
ance. Securities that are issued in a country where FTT is applied would be subject 
to the payment of the tax in the country of issuance, irrespective of where the 
transaction is conducted. If the parties in the transaction are not subject to the pay-
ment of the FTT according to the residence principle, the actual trading in securi-
ties issued in countries where FTT is applied would be taxable. Parties that trade 
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328 ance, unless they can prove that there is no interrelation between the economic 
substance of the said financial transaction and the territory of the countries that do 
apply the FTT (European Commission, 2013b).
Such a provision does in fact reduce liquidity for all trading in such financial in-
struments will be taxable, which can have negative effects not only on investors 
but also on the issuers of securities. Proof of the lack of connection of a financial 
transaction with countries in which the FTT is applied is incumbent on the tax 
payers themselves.
3.2 THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF TAXATION
Most EU countries have important financial sectors, and their fiscal capacity is 
thus important.
Table 1
Revenue from the taxation of financial transaction in selected EU member countries, 
2011
Member state Taxation revenue









United Kingdom 3,987.6 0.23
Source: European Commission (2013); Impact Assessment, pp. 62-68.
The figures in table 1 indicate how low the amount of tax collected is. Data from 
the European Commission (2013a) show that in 2011 various forms of the  taxation 
of financial transactions including financial instruments existed in 11 member 
states. Although in 2011 there were some indications that financial transactions 
would be taxed in Italy, a new system of taxation was introduced in March 2013 
for original securities and in July of the same year for derivatives (European 
 Commission, 2016).
European Commission (2013a) predicts that the introduction of a common FTT 
would result in a fall of GDP of 0.28% over a period of 40 years. It predicts that if 
there is no FTT, that around 2050 European GDP would be 81.4% greater, and that 
it if is introduced, 81.1% greater than the present value. Some estimates say that 
the introduction of an FTT might lead to a long-term rise in GDP of at least 0.25% 
(Griffith-Jones and Persaud, 2012). However, the ultimate effect will depend pri-
marily on the way in which the tax revenue is spent, that is, whether it will be 
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3293.3 IMPACTS OF TAXATION ON INVESTOR BEHAVIOURThe introduction of an FTT will increase transaction costs, which will lead to a 
change in the way in which investors act on the market, because trading in certain 
instruments might become more attractive.
An FTT might tend to bring about a reduction of short-term high-frequency trades that 
are on the whole based on algorithms. Since the tax will increase transaction costs and 
hence reduce the margin, certain short-term trading will not be represented any more 
to a sufficient extent, for example, high frequency trading and delta-hedging.
In addition, financial internalisation will, because of the increased transaction 
costs, probably be replaced with financial intermediation.1 Increased transaction 
costs will thus lead to an increase in the effective tax burden and a reduction of the 
sales margin.
Certain changes can be looked for in the behaviour of financial institutions that 
can replace repo operations with overnight loans or short-term liquidity loans (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2013a).
Trading in derivative contracts might, according to the estimates of the European 
Commission (2013a) experience a fall of as much as 75%, because investors will 
lose their interest in it. Taxation of derivative contracts will lead to an increase in the 
effective tax rate with an increase in the effect of scale. Since the proposed tax rate 
on derivative trading is several times small than the rate on basic instruments, it will 
be more acceptable to make contracts with a financial ratio of less than 1:10. With 
ratios of greater than 1:10, entering into a derivative contract will result in a rise in 
the effective tax rate, which can be clearly seen in the following case. If a derivative 
contract with a notional amount of 1 million euros is made with the use of a ratio of 
1:100 the economic value of the financial transaction will come to 10,000 euros. 
Irrespective of the fact that 10,000 euros will be paid by the transaction, the taxable 
amount is still the notional amount of 1 million euros. With the application of a tax 
rate of 0.01% on the notional amount, a tax liability of 100 euros is incurred. But if 
the tax paid is expressed as a ratio of the transaction amount of 10,000 euros, the 
effective tax rate comes to 1%. Hence, more pronounced use of the effect of scale in 
derivative operations will lead to an increase in the effect tax rate.
Taxation would probably result in a change in management strategy in investment 
and pension funds, from active management to buy and hold strategies.2 An active 
strategy would lead to greater taxation. The tax itself should not affect manage-
ment strategies of money funds.
1 Financial internalisation implies more successive purchases and sales of securities before ultimate sale to 
the end user, and financial intermediation means the creation of mediators between seller and buyer without 
trading for own account. 
2 An active management strategy implies vigorous changes in the structure of the fund, while buy and hold 
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330 Taking into account the very high quality protection mechanisms for preventing tax 
evasion with a combination of the principles of residence and issuance, it would not 
pay to shift the principal place of business of a financial institution outside the FTT 
jurisdiction as long as trading takes place with a counterparty located within the ju-
risdiction of the FTT or trading is done with instruments issued in a country in which 
FTT is applied. Payment of tax then can be avoided only by abandoning the market 
of the countries that apply the FTT, which is not very likely.
Because of the high fiscal and other aids to the financial sector, in the EU its fiscal 
contribution is being re-examined. By increased collaboration of member states the 
conditions might be created for easier harmonisation of taxation of the financial sector.
4  THE POSSIBILITIES FOR TAXING FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS  
IN CROATIA
Although the FTT is not of recent date, and its application in various forms is 
widespread in the countries of the EU and elsewhere, the tax policy of the Repub-
lic of Croatia has avoided it, out of historical reasons and also in an attempt to 
increase the competitiveness of the domestic capital market.
Taking into account the stability of financial institutions, along with the regulatory 
measures of the Croatian National Bank (CNB), state interventions in the financial 
sector have not been necessary, on the contrary, in the crisis times, it made ample 
contributions to the public finances. For all these reasons, there has been little 
discussion of the introduction of an FTT.
Recent economic trends have reduced the attractiveness of investing in the finan-
cial markets. Regular turnover on the Zagreb Stock Exchange fell by 35% in 2012, 
trading in shares dropped by 44%, while because of investor caution, the turnover 
in bonds was more than twice that of 2011. In September 2012, trading in struc-
tured products started, including various forms of certificates (index, bonus, turbo 
certificates). Trading in these products was counted into regular trading (ZSE, 
2013). The Zagreb Stock Exchange does not carry out trading in derivatives.
Since regulatory systems are an important component of contemporary stock ex-
change dealings for the sake promptly spotting and preventing manipulative trad-
ing patterns, early in 2015 the Zagreb Stock Exchange introduced a new system 
for the supervision of market segments – organised market, multilateral trading 
platforms and OTC markets (ZSE, 2016).
In 2013 there were no important changes in the total turnover, but it can be pointed 
out that there was a turnover 42 times greater in commercial bills, and a trade in 
structured products that was twice as high as in 2012 (ZSE, 2014).
In 2014 there was no significant rise in regular turnover in the total amount. Trade 
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3312013 level, while trade in bonds was increased by 65%, and structured product 
turnover fell by 44% (ZSE, 2015).
In 2015, regular trading was reduced by 9.3%, and OTC trading by 17.8%, which 
suggests that the capital market became less attractive to investors. Still there was 
a rise in the tourist industry segment (the CROBEXturist® index rose by 23.7% 
from 2014) (ZSE, 2016).
Table 2
Turnover on the Zagreb Stock Exchange 2011-2015 (in billion kuna)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average
Value Change (%)
Regular trading  5.9  3.9  3.8  3.9  3.5  4.2 -12.2
OTC transactions 18.2 19.3 18.2 26.6 21.9 20.8    4.7
Total 24.1 23.2 22.0 30.5 25.4 25.0    1.3
Source: Zagreb Stock Exchange (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016), author’s elaboration.
Table 2 shows that in the 2011-2015 period the average value of a OTC transac-
tions was almost five times the size of average regular trading on the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange.
Taking into consideration as taxable amount the average value of all transactions 
(regular trading and OTC transactions) the revenues from a possible introduction 
of an FTT might be simulated. On the assumption that both parties in a financial 
transaction are liable to the tax and that they are Republic of Croatia residents, the 
taxable amount (an average of 25 billion kuna) is doubled, and comes to 50 bil-
lion. If the minimum tax rate of 0.1% is applied, the tax revenue will come to 50 
million kuna. For the sake of a comparison of the importance of these revenues 
from taxation in total revenues and in the tax revenues of the government budget, 
table 3 shows total tax revenues of the budget in 2015.
Table 3
Revenue of the government budget in 2015 (in billion kuna)




Revenue from assets  2.8
Revenue from administrative fees  3.6
Other revenue  6.9
Total revenue 109.1
Source: Ministry of Finance (2016).
If, then, the simulated revenue from FTT is compared with the figures in table 3, 
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332 It can be concluded, then, that by taxing transactions on the Croatian capital mar-
ket would be generated relatively small amounts of tax revenue and that the taxa-
tion of turnover in securities on the Zagreb Stock Exchange would be insuffi-
ciently effective. If one takes into consideration the essential administrative costs 
involved in the collection of the tax, although they should not be very great be-
cause of the well-arranged computer infrastructure, the actual amount of tax col-
lected would not justify it being employed in practice. This form of taxation, then, 
would be insufficiently productive. If the possible impacts on the volume of trad-
ing, liquidity, cost of capital and market efficiency are considered, then there are 
no practical grounds for the taxation of the Croatian capital market.
However, when the fact that according to the EU-level proposal for the taxation of 
the transactions of financial institutions primarily according to the principle of 
residence is taken into consideration, the real tax revenues could be very different 
from those of the simulation. Transactions on the Zagreb Stock Exchange are 
conducted by residents and non-residents. In the Republic of Croatia, only the 
transactions of residents would be taxed, irrespective of the place in which the 
transactions are carried out. Real tax revenues would then include all the transac-
tions of residents and the transactions of non-residents to the extent that they are 
trading in financial instruments issued in the Republic of Croatia and are not at the 
same time residents of some EU member state in which a common FTT would be 
in application. Hence all such transactions need simulating.
Tax revenues would certainly cover transactions in derivative contracts among 
financial institutions. According to projections of the European Commission 
(2013d) revenue from the taxation of derivative contracts would come to about 
two thirds of all revenue from an FTT.
A preliminary analysis of the possibilities of taxing financial transactions in the 
Republic of Croatia according to the proposal to introduce an FTT at the EU11 
level suggests that the Croatian capital market is still not sufficiently developed to 
be able to generate abundant revenues from such a tax.
If domestic financial institutions carry out taxable financial transactions with fi-
nancial institutions in the EU11 or trade in financial instruments issued in these 
countries, they would be obliged to pay FTT in the country of residence of the 
counterparty or the country of issuance of the security, which would lead to a 
drain of tax revenue outside the borders of the Republic of Croatia. Hence in-
creased collaboration of the Republic of Croatia concerning the issue of taxing 
financial transactions would be justified in order to ensure that Republic of Croatia 
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3335 CONCLUSION
One of the possible solutions for a more equitable contribution of the financial 
sector to public finances is the reinforcement of the role of indirect taxation of 
 financial transactions. The global trend toward the reduction of the taxation of 
 financial transactions in the last two decades because of the liberalisation of capi-
tal flows has been replaced with a more powerful role for the state in the regula-
tion of financial markets. Although taxation of financial transactions is not impor-
tant in overall public revenues, developed world economies are not about to give 
up on this form of taxation, but want to increase its fiscal role.
If one considers the taxation from the standpoint of its impact on financial 
markets, an FTT will certainly increase transaction costs. Numerous empirical 
investigations about the impact of an FTT on the function of financial markets 
have led to various conflicting conclusions, largely related to the microstructure of 
a given market. There is a consensus that taxation will reduce the number of 
 financial transactions generated as well as the value of financial instruments, 
which will bring about an increase in the cost of capital. There are opposed ideas 
about the effect on liquidity and volatility. Tax revenues, then, depend con-
siderably on the reaction of the market to increased transaction costs consequent 
upon the introduction of the tax.
Expensive government rescue operations have forced the European Commission to 
re-examine the fiscal contribution made by the financial sector; but because of the 
different national systems of taxing financial transactions, there is a lack of harmo-
nisation. With the establishment of the enhanced cooperation system in the EU11, 
conditions can be created for an easier establishment of a consensus among all the 
members of the EU and greater harmonisation. The actual execution of common 
taxation has a broad tax base since it provides for the taxation of all transactions in 
basic and derivative instruments both inside and outside organised markets. With a 
combination of the principles of residence and issuance, it is possible to have good 
mechanisms of protection against tax evasion. The future of common taxation at 
EU level will depend on the wiliness of all members to find a high quality, effective 
and generally accepted manner of taxing financial transactions.
A preliminary analysis of the possibilities of taxing the Croatian capital market 
has shown that there are no practical grounds for the implementation of such a tax, 
because the insufficiently developed market would be incapable of generating suf-
ficiently abundant tax revenues. However, if financial transactions are not taxed in 
the Republic of Croatia, Croatian residents might be taxed in EU member states 
that do apply this tax, which would lead to an outflow of tax revenues, and so it 
would be justified for the Republic of Croatia to join in the procedure of enhanced 
cooperation to do with the FTT. It can, then, be concluded that the common taxa-
tion of financial transactions at the EU level could meet the interests of the Repub-
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334 The costs and benefits of the taxation and also of the non-taxation of financial trans-
actions in the Republic of Croatia will be able to be seen better when the FTT is in 
the phase of practical implementation in the EU. Then it will be certainly possible to 
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